Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Clinton City, A Municiple Corporation Of Utah,
And Elwyn Parker v. Frank Patterson, Jack D.
Patterson, Lewis B. Patterson, Dba Frank Patterson
And Sons : Brief of Respondents

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Glen E. Fuller; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Clinton City v. Patterson, No. 10913 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4310

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

' IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLINTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation of Utah, and EL WYN
PARKER,
Plaintiffa and Appellanta,

I

vs.

I

D. FRANK PATTERSON, .JACK
D. PATTERSON, LEWIS B.
PATTERSON and F. DAVID
PATTERSON, d/b/a Frank Patterson and Sons,

Case No.
10913

Defendant• and Reapondent8.

I
I
~

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from a Judgment of the Dtstriet Cout,

Davis County, Utah
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Presldlnc

Glen E. Puller
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants-Reapop4ea$1
4. M. Ferro
.
1.~!!lock, of the firm of
.._ ... 1,,,ni...OW, WATSON& WARNOCK
Bank
Building
-t Walker
Lake City,
Utah
4ttorneya for Plaintiffs-Appellants

II
,

D
F' L E

!~1

JUL 1 91967

.. lllNTED •Y •ALT LAIC.• TIME•

INDEX
Page

NATURE OF THE CASE ..................................
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................
ARGUMENT ............................................................
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT CONDUCTING A "LIVESTOCK FEED LOT" OPERATION ON THEIR "HOOPER FARM." ..........
POINT II.
THE 'VINTER :FEEDING OF CATTLE
ON THE DEFENDANTS' "H 0 0 PER
FARM" 'VAS A REASONABLE AND EXISTING NON-CONFORMJNG USE ...............

1
2

8

8

10

A. The Winter Feeding Use Had Existed for
Many Years on the "Hooper Farm." ........................ 20
B. A 'Vinter Feeding Usage of 1,000 Cattle on
the "Hooper Farm" Was a Reasonable Use ......... 27
C. The Extent of Defendants' Winter Feeding
Usage of the "Hooper Farm" Was Established at
the Time of the June 3, 1965 Ordinance ................. 31
j POINT III.

j THE EXTENT OF WINTER FEEDING
• OPERATIONS ON THE VARIOUS FIELDS
OF THE "HOME FARM" WAS NEVER AT
ISSUE IN THE LITIGATION ......................... 34
POINT IV.
,
' THE INVOLVED ORDINANCES ARE
. rNCONSTITUTION AL ACTS SPECIFIC1 ALLY DIRECTED AT THESE DEFENDi ANTS ........................................................................... 38

I

I

co NcLu sION ---------------- ----~ ------------------------------------ 44

l

Page

AUTIIORITIES CITED

18 A.L.R. 726 .............................................................. 22
City of Clinton City Ordinance 2-10 ........................ IO
McQuillen "Municipal Corporations" Vol. 8:
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

25.30 p. 64 .................................................... 30
25.42 p. 90-91 ................................................ 43
25.59 p. 128 ................ -............................ 9, 11
25.62 p. 138 .................................................... 11
25.63, p. 142 .................................................. 43
25.71, p. 159 ................................................ 12
25.181 p. 468 ................................................ 29
25.201, p. 502 ................................................ 25
25.203, p. 509 ................................................ 25
25.208, p. 520 ............... ~ ................................ 23
CASES CITED

Abbedessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New
Haven, 134 Conn. 38 54 A. 2d 675 .................. 24
Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice and Fuel Co., 245 Mich.
261, 222 N. W. 86 ................................................ 27
Allen v. Corpus Christi (Tex.), 247 S.

"r.

2d 130 .. 32

Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552,
254 P. 2d 865 ........................................................ 41
Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman, 352 Penn. 79,
42 A. 2d 60 .. .. ... ... ............ ... ... .. ... ......... ... ..... .. ........ 23
Brady v. Keene, 90 N. H. 99, 4 A. 2d 659 .............. 9
Carroll v. Arlington Co., 186 Va. 575, 44 S. E. 2d 6.. 12
Cassel Realty Co. v. Omaha, 144 N eh. 753,
14 N. W. 2d 600 ............................................ - .. 41
11

Page
Cynic Association of Dearborn T. P ... Dist. No. 3
· v. Horowitz, 318 Michigan 333, 28 N.W. 2d 97 __ 27
Davidson County v. Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327, 198
s.w. 2d 812 ---·-------·---·--·----·---·-·----·-·--·--···-····-----·---·-43
DeFelice v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town
of East Haven, 130 Conn. 156, 32 Atlantic
2d 635 ------------------··---·-····--···-····-····················-···---27
Dunes v. Los Angeels, 211 California 304, 295 P. 14 33
Edmonds v. Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. 2d 542,
255 P. 2d 777 --··---------·······························-········--·
24
Eubank v Richmond 226 U. S. 137, 57 Law. Ed.
156, 33 Supreme Court 76 --··········-·······-···········-···
42
Ex parte 'Vestellison, 38 Okla Crim. 207,
259 Pac. 873 .................................................... 9, 10
Funk v. Orleans Corp., 159 Fla. 646, 32 S. 2d 425 .. 43
Gulf C. and A. F. R. Co. v. White, 281 W. 2d 441 .. 24
Hauser v. Arness, 267 P. 2d 691, 44 Wash. 2d....
( 1954) ····································································
44
Higgins v. Baltimore, 206 Maryland 89, 110 A. 2d
503 ·····-······································································
25
Humphries v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 6I6,
73 A. 2d 407 ·-··-·--·----·-·········································-·
24
Johnson v. Huntsville, 249 Alabama 36, 29 Southern
2d 342 ................................................................ 9, I I
Jones v. Board of Adjustment of Denver, ll9 Colo.
420, 204 P. 2d 560 ····-··-················-··-····················
I2
.Tones v. Logan City Corporation (Utah Supreme
Court No. I0622, May 24, I967) .................... I8
Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, I8I N. E. 3I2 .. 43

w

Page
Kovelman v. Plaut, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 280 ................ 23
Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17, 198 P. 2d 134.. 26
Lane v. Bigelow, 135 N. J. L. 195, 50 A. 2d 638 .. 24
Lockner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 Law. Ed.
937, 25 Supreme Court 539 .............................. 30
London v. Robinson, 94 Cal. App. 774, 271 P. 921.. 32
Mallett v. Village of Marnoroneck, 123 N. Y. S.
2d 249 .................................................................... 9
Michigan Lake Building Corporation v. Hamilton,
340 Ill. 284, 172 N. E. 710 ................................... 42
Neef v. Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N. E. 2d 947 .. 42
Palmer v. Detroit, 306 Mich. 339, 11 N. W. 2d 199.. 25
People v. Ferris, 18 Ill. App. 2d 346, 152 N. E.
2d 183 .................................................................... 24
People v. Perkins, 282 N. Y., 329, 26 N. E. 2d 278 .. 24
Ridgefield Terrace Realty Co. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 136 N. J. L. 311, 55 A. 2d 812 ................ 43
Riverdale Community Planning Association, Inc.
v. Crinnion, 133 N. Y. Supp. 2d 706 .................... 32
State v. Bellview, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P. 2d 899. 32
State v. Superior Court of King County, 144
Washington 244, 284 P. 93 ................................ 32
Stuart et al v. Mitschele, et al, 135 N. J. L. 406
52 A. 2d 421 .......................................................... 25
Trans-Oceanic Oil Corporation v. Santa Barbara,
85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P. 2d 148 .................. 32
Watseka v. Blatt, 320 Ill. Appeals 191, 50 N. E. 2d
589, 381 Ill. 276, 46 N. E. 2d 374 .................... 12
Wilkins v. San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175
P. 2d 542 ........................................................ 29, 42
lV

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLINTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation of Utah, and ELWYN
PARKER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
D. FRANK PATTERSON, JACK

D. PATTERSON, LEWIS B.
PATTERSON and F. DAVID
PATTERSON, d/b/a Frank Patterson and Sons,
Defendants and Respondents.

f

I

Case No.
10913

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This litigation involves the problems and difficulties
involved when a small municipality of 1600 residents
first adopts a general ordinance regulating the uses
of property located within its boundaries, and (as respondents view the case) the attempts made thereunder
by a city council to regulate and control such uses and
property rights by specific provisons added to its gen1

eral ordinance which were adopted contrary to the
recommendations of its planning commission, and which
specific provisions were directed expressly against respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Patterson for more than 15 years have
operated a farming and livestock activity in the extreme
northern portion of Davis County in the community
of Clinton. Their holdings consisted of approximately
310 acres of cultivated crop land (Tr. 68) , and 80 acres
of salt grass pasture land, on which were located
corrals and facilities for keeping livestock on approximately 12 acres. The 310 acre farm, referred herein
as the "Home Farm" was located in a relatively sparsely
populated area generally west of the second parallel
set of railroad tracks lying westerly of Highway 91
(Tr. 13, 19); the 80 acre salt grass pasture (and feed
lot facilities) lying approximately another mile west
of the "Home Farm".
Over the years the defendants would devote the
cultivated crop land to the summer growing of field
corn, which was cut in the fall and placed in open pit
silos for winter feeding use. All the corn silage was
fed, together with certain purchased mixed supplements, to cattle which defendants bought and sold
throughout the year's operation. Although the numbers
of cattle would fluctuate from month to month, a maximum of approximately 2,500 head of cattle would be
2

placed in the feed lot on the 80-acre field at the extreme
, 1-est end of Clinton City during the period between
April 15 and October 15 when the weather was warm
and <lry (Tr. 74). In the fall when the weather became
11etter the animals were taken from the feed yard about
October 15th, and placed in the various fields of the
"Home Farm" after the corn was harvested. The
animals were fed on the fields during the wet winter
months, and were moved from field to field so that their
droppings would uniformly and evenly provide for a
thin layer of fertilizer to be left on the fields. Immediately after the removal of the cattle from the fields
on or about April 1st of each year the fields were either
plowed or disced so that the fertilizer would be utilized
to enhance the growing of corn during the f olowing
summer season. Needless to say, the lands of the Pattersons were extremely fertile and customarily produced
earn silage which would yield an average of 25 ton of
corn silage per acre (Tr. 174) .
It was conceded by all parties to the litigation that
the feed yards where the animals were kept during the
summer months on the 12-acre area of the 80-acre
sale grass tract at the extreme west end of Clinton City
was in fact a "feed yard". Actually defendants annually
secured a permit, or license, from the Utah State Department of Agriculture for the operating of this yard
(Tr. 80).

The manner of operation of the corn fields for
feeding purposes during the winter months is outlined

3

in Findings of Fact number 4 (R. 11-12), but can be

generalized as follows: The cattle were taken from the
feed lot, or from direct purchase deliveries, and distributed into several of the various farm fields after
the crops were removed. They ate the stubble and
residue from the harvest and were fed corn silage from
the farm production, mixed with other ingredients,
during the winter months. The fields were fairly large
in size, thereby affording maximum movement for the
animals. They were fed from a truck which would
come into the field and transfer the feed into portable
feeding troughs from which the cattle could come and
feed from time to time. The feeding troughs were portable and customarily moved at intervals of from 2 to
4 days so as to allow the droppings from the livestock
to be deposited uniformly over the entire field in quantities sufficiently limited so as to permit the fertilizer
to be plowed or disced under when springtime and
warm weather arrived. Care had to be taken so as to
avoid placing too much fertilizer on the land (since
this would cause the crops to burn and die during the
hot summer season) , and the system permitted each
field to be so fertilized on a rotation basis of everyother or every-third year.
This system of winter feeding on the fields as
utilized by defendants was a somewhat modernized and
mechanized version of an old practice among farmers,
and had been a common means of feeding livestock in
the Clinton area for many years (Tr. 47, 90).
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During 1963 one of the stalwarts and venerable
citizens of that area-Mr. John D. Hooper-passed
away. Among his assets was a 100 acre tract of farm
]and in Clinton, located approximately one mile south
of the defendants' "Home Farm", near the southern
houndary of Clinton City. This farm eventually was
offered for sale in probate proceedings, and the Pattersons decided to bid on the property. Similarly, others
in the Clinton area, known as the "Muir Group", also
decided to bid on the same property at court sale-with
the thought that the land could ultimately be utilized
for subdivision purposes (Tr. 196, 197).
As a result of court bidding for the property, hereinafter referred to as the "Hooper Farm", the Pattersons prevailed-and the seed was planted which grew
into this lawsuit. The date of the purchase of the
"Hooper Farm" was January 28, 1964 (Tr. 165).
At or about the time of the purchase of the "Hooper
Farm" by the Pattersons, Clinton City was preparing
to adopt its first general ordinance. This ordinance,
typical of many which have been adopted by communities in Utah, recognized non-conforming uses and
"Uses of Right", including thereunder agricultural
uses. The general ordinance was adopted on February
Ii, 1964-just 20 days following the purchase by defendants of the 100 acre "Hooper Farm"-and included
arestriction under Agriculture (R. l) as foll9ws:
(1) -Agriculture, as defined herein, and specifically excluding livestock feed lots.
5

After purchasing the "Hooper Farm" the defendants permitted the existing tenant to remain in possession during the remainder of the winter season; however, commencing in the fall of 1964 they placed 965
head of cattle on the "Hooper Farm" for winter feeding
under the system previously outlined ( 'l'r. 86). These
animals were maintained during substantially most of
the winter season on this property. Incidentally, as
will be pointed out later, the "Hooper Farm" and the
number of livestock maintained thereon constituted the
chief bone of contention in the litigation which followed.
On June 3, 1965, immediately following the 19641965 winter feeding operation of the Pattersons on
the ''Hooper Farm", Clinton City, possibly because of
severe doubts which existed among the city councilmen
as to whether the operation on the "Hooper Farm"
was that of a "feed lot" (Tr. 58), passed and adopted
an Amended Ordinance which added the two new subparagraphs ( 5) and ( 6) to the existing ordinance, establishing the following Uses By Right:
" ( 6) (a) The seasonal winter feeding, pasturing, and maintaining of domestic animals upon lots or property of 5 acres
or more during the period in each winter season, commencing October 15, and
ending April 1, of each 12-month period, provided that there shall be no
feeding, maintaining, or pasturing of
more than 6 head of livestock per acre
subject to the conditions hereinafter
stated.
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(b) The land upon which said animals have
been winter fed, pastured, or maintained must he plowed or deep disked
at least once immediately following the
above-stated seasonal period. Seeded
pasture need not be tilled.
( d) In no event, and regardless of the size
of the land area, shall there be more
than 250 head of livestock confined
within the same fenced area."
(See Supp. Record)
During the following winter season of 1965-1966
the defendants again placed livestock on the "Hooper
Farm" in the amount of 1,015 head (Tr. 86), which
exceeded the number provided for in the June 3, 1965
Amended Ordinance. Thereafter, on February 9, 1965,
this action was commenced against defendants by a
Complaint ( R. 1) wherein it was alleged:
"2.

That the above named defendants conduct a business of operating cattle feed
lots within the City Limits of Clinton
CI't y, • • • .,

In seeking injunctive relief plaintiff further alleged (R. 2):
"4.

That the defendants and each of them
are operating feed lots for cattle within
the City Limits of Clinton City on
property which has been zoned for Agricultural Use, and defendants are now
using and operating f-;-ed lots for cattle
on said property in viola ti on of the
ordinances of Clinton City."

7

The matter was set for trial before Hon. Thornley
K. Swan; however, plaintiffs' attorneys filed an Affidavit of Prejudice as to Judge Swan, and the matter
was tried on May 3, 1966 before the Hon. Charles G.
Cowley at Farmington, Utah. From an adverse judgment holding that the operations of the defendants
on the "Hooper Farm" did not constitute a "feed lot"
operation and holding that defendants were entitled
to winter feed 1,000 head of cattle on the "Hooper
Farm", both as a reasonable use and as a non-conforming use, plaintiff has appealed against these defendants.

ARGUMENT

I.
DEFENDANTS 'VERE NOT CONDUCTING A "LIVESTOCK FEED LOT" OPERATION ON THEIR "HOOPER FARM".
Zoning ordinances of the type here involved, which
restrict and limit the uses to which private real property
can be put, must be strictly construed as a matter of law.
Further, ordinances of the type here involved which
carry with them penalties are further subject to the
rules of strict construction. With these principles in
mind it is rather interesting to observe the comment
made on page 2 of the plaintiffs' Brief where it stated
that the lower court did not provide " ... any definition
of what constitutes a 'livestock feed yard' ".
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It was just this failure of the ordinance itself to
define a "livestock fed lot" which generated so much
nf the confusion in this case and which-in the opinion
of the defendants-rendered that portion of the ordinance invalid.
"An ordinance must be clear, precise, definite
and certain in its terms, and an ordinance vague
to the extent that its precise meaning cannot be
ascertained is invalid."

Ex parte Westellison, 38 Okla. Crim. 207, 259
Pac. 873.
"A zoning ordinance to be valid must comply
with the requisites pertaining to ordinances generally, i.e. enactment in good faith, definiteness
and certainty, reasonableness, uni/ormity of operation and freedom from discrimination.''

Brady v. Keene 90 N. H. 99, 4 A. 2d 658
McQuillen "Municipal Corporations'' Vol. 8
sec. 25.59, p. 128
"Like all ordinances, a zoning ordinance to
be valid must be reasonably definite and certain
in its terms so that it is reasonably capable of
being understood."
Johnson v. Huntsville 249 Alabama 36, 29
Southern 2d 342
Since the Clinton City ordinance is penal in nature,
it must be strictly construed.
Zoning ordinances are penal in nature.

Ex. pare W estellison (above cited)
Mallett v. Village of Marnoroneck 123 N.Y.S.

2d 249

9

The Clinton City Ordinance is penal.
".2-10 VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE
AND PENALTIES.
Any person, firm, corporation, whether as principal, agent, employee or otherwise, violating
any of the provisions of this ordinance or requirements or decision of the Board of Adjustment shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punishable by a fine
of not more than two hundred ninety nine
($299.00) dollars, or by imprisonment for a
term not to exceed six ( 6) months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment. Such person, firm
or corporation shall be deemed to be guilty of
a separate offense for each and every day during any portion of any violation of this ordinance is committed, continued by such person,
firm, or corporation, and shall be punishable
as herein provided."
Clinton City Ordinance 2-10
Ordinances must be of sufficient definiteness and
certainty to define a criminal offense. The necessity for
certainty is compounded when the ordinance is penal
in character. Penal ordinances like penal statutes are

to be strictly construed.

Ex. parte W estellison 38 Okla. Crim.207 259
Pac. 873
" ... zoning ordinances and regulations should
establish uniform rules to guide administrat~ve
officers in applying them. The rule merges with
that of definiteness and certainty; zoning restructions mu.st be clear as a ru.le of l,aw and not
left to proof."
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McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 8,
sec. 25.62, p. 138
"The restriction on property rights in the several zones must be declared as a rule of law in
the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of
proof of extrinsic evidence parole or written."

Johnson v. City of Huntsville 29 So. 2d 342
"The rule of certainty and definiteness of zoning ordinances verges on or is identical with the
rule that they must establish a clear rule or standard to operate uniformly and govern their administration, in order that arbitrariness and discrimination in administrative interpretation and
application be avoided."
M cQuillen, "Municipal Corporations" Vol 8,
sec. 25.59, p. 128

•

•

•

An ordinance which does not properly define its
terms can be arbitrary and unreasonable, and void.
"Furthermore, the definition of junkyard in
Sec. 10 of the ordinance cannot be sustained. If,
as contended by the appellee, the "and", as used
therein, is to be interpreted as "or", it is obvious
that dealing in either hides, furs, rubber, wool,
used cars or other used car parts, does not without some other specification or qualification, constitute dealing in junk or make the place of any
such business a junk yard. The ordinance does
not comply with any accepted definition of the
junk business. Webster's definition of "junk" is:
"Old iron or other metal, glass, paper, cordage,
or other waste or discarded material which may
be treated or repaired so as to be used again
in some form." Dealing in used cars and used
11

car parts. carries wit~ i~ the idea of their being
used agam for the or1gmal purpose, without reprocessing. Junk, as the term is ordinarily un.
derstood, means articles that have outlived their
usefulness in their original form, and are com.
monly gathered up and sold to be converted into
another product, either of the same or a different
kind by some manufacturing process."
"In our opinion the above mentioned provision of sec. 9 and the definition of a junk yard
in Sec. 10 of the ordinance are not in accord
with the provisions delegated by the zoning act,
and are so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
render those sections void. \Ve are further of the
opinion that even if otherwise valid, the ordinance, as applied to the appellants' newly acquired property is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore void as to such property."

Watseka v. Blatt 320 Ill. Appeals 191 50
N. E. 2d 589, 381 Ill. 276, 46 N. E. 2d 374
"Generally in the construction of zoning ordinances, particularly where they are penal in
character with respect to one being prosecuted
thereunder, they will be construed subject to
the principle that the words used must be give~
their common acceptation. Common sense, ord1·
nary, and natural meanings are preferred, ... '

McQuillen "M11-nicipal Corporations", Vol. 8,
sec. 25.71 p 159. See also:
Carroll v. Arlington Co. 186 Va. 575, 44 S.E.
2d 6
Jones v. Board of Adjustment of Denver, 119
Colo 420, 204 P2d 560
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_........._

Being forced to defend their position as to whether
rJr not they were conducting a "feed lot" operation on
the" Hooper Farm", defendants went to the 1964 Ordinance (Exhibit A) , but could find nowhere therein any
definition of a livestock "feed lot". However, the ordinance did provide some help in the following statement
relating to "Interpretation":
" ... If in the course of admininstration hereof, a question arises as to the meaning of any
phrase, section or chapter, the interpretation
thereof given by the Chairman of the Planning
Commission shall be construed to be the official
interpretation thereof."

Lewis Patterson, who was Chairman of the Planning
Commission, testified (Tr. 1-7 5) that the city officials
never asked him for any interpretation of the phrase
"livestock feed lot".
It might be understandable that the plaintiff city
officials were acting under a clear misapprehension as
to the definition of the term in their proceedings against
the defendants had not Mayor Saunders readily admitted that the term was giving substantial confusion
to both the city council and the planning commission:

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Has the council ever asked

the chairman of the Planning Commission
to furnish it with a definition of what constitutes a feed lot?

A. I know that this was a matter of discussion
with them.
Q. In other words, you mean that was a matter -

13

1I
of discussion between some members of the
council with the Planning Commission?
A. I know it was a matter of discussion amongst
the council members, as well as amongst the
members of the Planning Commission.

Q. I see. So the definition of what constitutes
a feed lot has been discussed within the Planning Commission, as well as the council?
A. Yes, I believe so.
(T. 59)

•

•

•

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) All right, now any of these

other properties or fields, the one across from
your home or the field back of Mr. Patterson's home on 2300, or across the road, is
the council treating these as feed lots or as
an area subject to this other ordinance covering winter feeding?

A. Now I would say that there has been a variance of opinion on the council itself.
Q. In other words, the council can't agree; it·
that right?

A.

'V

ell, no.
opm10n.

There has been a variance of

Q. I see.
A. Generally speaking, I believe they would
regard this as a winter feed lot.
Q. As a winter feed lot?

A. Uh, huh.
Q. All right.Now this Hooper Property, is this
a feed lot or a winter feeding operation under this amended ordinance, or a winter feed

14
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I

lot? I would like to know what the city is
considering these operations as being?
A. 'V ell, I can speak for myself, and I know
some members of the City Council would
consider this a winter feed lot.
Q. 'V ell, I take it, that some members of the
council don't consider this as a winter feed
lot, either the Hooper Property or these
properties, except for the area clear to the
west; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir. This has been a matter of, not contention necessarily, but a question in the
minds, I think, of everyone on the council
just what does constitute a feed lot as such.
(Tr. 57-58)
Faced with a lack of definition in the ordinance
and absolute confusion in the minds of city officials,
defendants undertook to establish from experts in the
livestock business what ingredients were necessary to
constitute a feed lot. The following definitions were
given:
FRANK PATTERSON:
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) No. We want to know what
you think a feed yard is ?
A. Well, a feed yard is where you feed, and
you've got your permanent fence, your permanent mangers and your permanent water.
That's a feed lot.

Q. According to your definition of what constitutes a feed yard or a feed lot, would you
classify any of the feeding operations on the
Hooper place or in the vicinity of your Home

15

place as coming within the definition of a
feed yard or feed lot?

A. No.
Q. Would you classify the operation in the pens
on the 12-acre portion of the 80 acres as constituting a feed yard?

A. Yes, that's a feed yard.

*

*

(Tr.93)

*

. A. Well, my definition of a feed yard - If
they're not there over six months, then they're
. not a feed yard. They've got to be there over
six months to be a feed yard ..

( ~r. Fuller) : That's all I have.You may cross
examme.
(Tr. 99-100)

*

CHARLES PARK

•

•

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) From your experience in
the business, would you give the court your
definition of what a feed yard or feed lot is?
A. Well, my definition of a feed lot would be
where the cattle are put in a corral that's
fenced and put in a small area and fed there
permanently. That's· a feed lot. Now that's
my definition of one.
Any farmer that has a cow or a lamb or
whatever he has, a horse, and run them in
the fields, I wouldn't call that a feed lot.
Q. Now as to the operation that the Pattersons
are conducting with their winter feeding, by

16

your definition would you classify that as
a feed lot operation?
A. Down west where they have them in them
corrals, yes, I would call that a feed lot.
Where they are scattered around through
the fields and moved off, I wouldn't call that
a feed lot.
Mr. Fuller: Thafs all I have.

*

*

(Tr. 156}

*

LEWIS PATTERSON:
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Would you give us, if you
will, your definition of what constitutes a
feed lot, Mr. Patterson?
A. I feel that a feed lot must be fully enclosed
with permanent fencing, that it must have
permanent feed racks-feed bunks, as you
might call them-must have a permanent
water facility, and the cattle must be kept
in that enclosed area at least 180 days.

Q. During what period of time? Continuously,
or by a year, or by what standard are you
using?
A. Within a year's time, yes.
Q. All right. On the properties that you and
your father and brothers are operating,
which, in your opinion would meet your definition of a feed lot?
A. Only the feed lot in the west end of Clinton
that is fully enclosed with permanent feed
racks.
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THE COURT: There isn't any dispute between the parties on that; is there?
MR. WARNOCK: Yes, we have put in evidence that the use of the Hooper property
does constitute a feed lot.
(Tr. 181)
The very recent case of Jones vs. Logan City Corporation (Utah Supreme Court No. 10622, May 24,
1967), furnishes help in this situation. There this Court,
in ref erring to powers of the Hoard of Condemnation,
stated:
"While the statute above mentioned grants to
cities the power to declare what shall be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact
define what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 120
above referred to, which grants to the Board
of Condemnation the right to determine whether
ainy building constitutes a menace to public
health or public safety, does .not provide the
standards on which the Board can base its findings as to what is or what is not a menace to
public health or public safety."
It is hardly any wonder that Judge Cowley ruled
in the Judgment and Decree that, as to the "Hooper
Farm" and the "Home Farm""2. That all livestock activities conducted upon
the remaining real properties belonging to
defendants, or to any of them, within Clinton City constitutes the seasonal ,winter
feeding, pasturing and maintaining of livestock, . . . and such activities do not constitute 'livestock feed lot' operations within
any provision of any ordinance of Clinton
City."
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II.
THE 'VINTER FEEDING OF CATTLE
ON THE DEFENDANTS' "HOOPER FARM"
WAS A REASONABLE AND EXISTING
NUN-CONFORMING USE.
Critical to a full understanding of this case is the
Amended Ordinance of June 3, 1965, referred to in
the foregoing Statement of Facts. This Ordinance
related to the winter feeding of livestock and set the
number at 6 head per acre. Although the trial issue
was framed on the basis of defendants' having conducted "feed lot" operations, plaintiff filed a Motion
To Amend Complaint with the Court approximately
5 days prior to trial. In its Amended Complaint the
plaintiff for the first time set forth the Ordinance of
June 3, 1965, relating to winter feeding of livestock.
The Record before this Court does not include the
Amended Complaint, but the Transcript is full of references to it and the objections made to its late filing
immediately before trial by counsel for defendants (Tr.
:.Hl). At any rate, the new Ordinance was injected
into the lawsuit in an attempt to limit the winter feeding
activities of defendants on the "Hooper Farm" to 6
head per acre (or a total of 600 head) . It was implicit
from the position taken by plaintiffs at the trial that
it still viewed defendants' activities on the "Hooper
Farm" as a "feed lot" activity, but apparently plaintiff
set up the additional ordinance as an attempt to limit
the activities of defendants on the subject property in
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the event it failed to secure relief on its "feed lot"
pleading.
(A) The Winter Feeding Use Had Existed Ji'or
Many Years On The "Hooper Farm".

In tracing the history of the agricultural usage
of the "Hooper Farm" since 1945, it was developed
at the trial that this fairly large 100-acre tract ha<l been
extensively used for livestock feeding purposes of various types. Plaintiffs' witness, John T. Child, although
rather evasive (Tr. 53) as to his own livestock usage
of the property while he was leasing it from J olm D.
Hooper, admitted (Tr. 48) that both he, his father,
and his brothers ran cattle on the property while they
had it under lease. He clearly remembered (Tr. 49)
that the maximum number that he had run on the place
under his own leadership was llO head, but he suffered
a lapse of memory relative to the number of head which
the entire family had operated on the property during
the period between 1940 and 1950, stating (Tr. 53)"Well, the older we get the poorer your memo. "
ory is.
Other witnesses familiar with the "Hooper Farm"
and the livestock activities associated with it over the
years had somewhat better memories:
MR. EUGENE 'V ALLACE, a Clinton
City councilman, who appeared pursuant to a
subpoena, stated that during the mid-forties he
hauled potatoes to livestock being fed on the
properties by the Child family (Tr. 133) , and
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that " ... There wrw a goodly number of cattle
... ". (Tr. 135). He stated further that " ...
I would say they were up in a few hundred head."
MR. LJ1~0 CHILD, a nearby resident of the
"Hooper Farm", testified (Tr. 161) that the
Child family maintained "several hundred head
a year" of livestock, mostly in the winter season.
On further questioning he placed the figure, as
the Child family operated during the middleforties, at "Five Hundred to l,000 head". His
general comment as to the size of the activity of
the Child family relative to winter feeding of
cattle was: " ... He was quite a big feeder."
MR. PARNELL GREEN, a livestock man
and a livestock trucker, stated that for five or
six years in the forties he transported livestock
from the "Hooper Farm" for the Child family
to Cudahy at regular intervals (Tr. 140), and
that the farm winter feeding operation was " ...
similar to the way we do today." He stated that
at that time there were used portable and stationary feed troughs so that the cattle could be
fed around on the entire farm. He observed
" ... quite a few hundred cattle, and (the numbers) would go up and down ... '' (Tr. 150).
Mr. Green observed that " . . . There was a
good-sized number of cattle there aU the time
. . . " and that movements in and out of the
fields through his trucks would be " . . . from
200 to 300, and 150 up, and like that. It was at
that time a good-sized deal." (Tr. 151) .
It seems that the Child family ran into financing
difficulties (Tr. 44) and that their operation tapered
off somewhat. In the later years of Mr. Hooper's lease
of the property agricultural cropping continued, but
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the type and volume of animal feeding was somewhat
reduced and altered. In fact, immediately before the
Patterson purchase of the farm there were being ruu
both hogs and cattle on the property. Mr. Anderson,
the last lessee, testified (Tr. 64) that he had an actual
feed lot on the premises where he kept an annual gross
of 300 pigs, and that he sub-leased part of the fields
far maintaining 100 to 150 head of cattle.
A non-conforming use of property is not necessarily restricted to the exact number of livestock which
were placed on a given property at a given time. There
is a substantial amount of law stating that to simply
restrict non-conforming uses to exact numbers of animals, grocery items, automobiles for sale, etc., which
might have previously related to a given property is
an illogical approach. In order that a non-conforming
use be lost as a matter of right, the cases uniformly
hold that there must be an intent to "abandon" the nonconforming use. Abandonment requires "intent" under
the case law, and where non-conforming uses have been
reduced, or even temporarily terminated, they can be
re-instated unless the facts show the intent to abandon
such a use. There is an excellent annotation at 18
A.L.R. to 726, which points out through numerous cases
a diminution of, or temporary discontinuance of, a use
of a non-conforming nature, without an abandonment,
will not cause the loss of that right to terminate. Examples cited include economic considerations, seasonal
or market conditions, difficulty of leasing of property,
and similar matters.
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On the issue of whether an expanded volume of
activity would violate a non-conforming use right, there
is adequate legal authority indicating that expanded
volume of use is not necessarily a controlling feature:
"The general rule is that an increase in volume
of business alone is not an expansion of a nonconforming use. (Salerni v. Cheuy 140 Conn.
566 102 Atlantic 2d 528). Even a great increase
does not work a prohibited change. (Town of
Marblehead v. Rosenthall 316 Mass. 124 55
N.E. 2d 13). In other words, the nonconforming
use of the same premises may be not only continued but also increased in volume. (Building
CommissiJoner of Medford v. McGrath, 312
Mass. 461, 45 N. E. 2d 265). The prohibition
of a zoning ordinance is directed to new uses;
it imposes no restraint upon broadening the
scope of an existing use. (Bor01tgh of Cheswick
v. Bechman, 352 Penn. 79, 42 A. 2d 60). Neither
the extent, quantity or quality of the nonconforming use ordinarily is mentioned in zoning
measures, but only that it must, to exist as of
right, exist lawfully and in fact when zoning becomes effective."

Borough of Cheswick v Bechman as cited
McQuillen, "Municipal Corporations," Vol.
8, sec. 25.208 p 520
"Increase in volume of business does not effect
extension of nonconforming use if, in essence,
the business is the same."
Kovelman v Plaut 105 N. Y. S. 2d 280
"An increase in volume or intensity of a nonconforming use does not constitute an unlawful
extension or enlargement thereof."
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People v Ferris, 18 Ill. App. 2d 346, 152 N.
E. 2d 183
People v Perkins 282 N.Y. 329, 26 N. E. 2d

278

Humphries v Stuart Realty Corp. 364 Pa.

616, 73 A 2d 407

Gulf C. and A. F. R. Co. v White 281 S.W.

2d 441

*

*

*

It should also be brought out that a variation in the

nature of a non-conforming use, such as partially substituing a hog operation for a cattle feeding operation
on the "Hooper" place, likewise does not serve to destroy any established right to the use of his property:
"The continued non conforming use must be

similar to the use existing at the time the zoning

ordinance became effective, and, in determining
whether the nonconforming use was the same
before and after the passage of the zoning ordinance, each case must stand on its own facts."

Edmonds v Los Ange~ County 40 Cal. 2d

642, 255 p 2d 777

"The nonconforming use must in substance
be the same after the passage of a zoning ordinance as it was before. The continuance of an
existing nonconforming use carries with it all
the incidents of that use which appertained to
it when zoning was established in the city."

Lane v Bigelow 135 N. J. L. 195 50 A. 2d 638
Abbedessa v Board of Zoning Appeals of New
Haven 134 Conn. 28 54 A. 2d 675
24

See: McQuillin "Municipal Corporations"
Vol. 8 sec. 25.201 p 502
''Generally, an owner of property has a right
to discontinue a nonconforming use of a building
and change its use to a higher grade of nonconfarming use so long as the changed use can
be carried on with substantially the same facilities as the existing use."

M cQuillin, "Municipal Corporations" Vol. 8,

sec. 25.203 p 509

Higgins v Baltimore, 206 Maryland 89,

A. 2d 503

no

Palmer v Detroit 306 Mich. 449, II N. W. 2d

199

"When we start with the premise that the
respondent could use his farm for raising cattle
then there seems to be no reason why he should
not use the farm for raising horses. Nor do we
think that because there was a by-product which
was sold for medicinal purposes changes the
result in any respect."
" ... In fine, the premises in question could
be used for farming. This was a non-conforming use. Because the owner saw fit to use the
premises for a kind of farming he had not previously followed, under the facts of this case,
it is not a violation of the zoning ordinance.
If in such use he required other buildings that
circumstance standing alone does not make the
action of the Board of Adjustment unreasonable."

Stuart et al v Mitschele, et al 135 N. J. L.

406 52 A. 2d 421
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It should be kept in mind that the owner of the
"Hooper Farm", prior to its purchase by the Pattersons, was an elderly man and that the property had
been leased for many years. This factor, plus economic
considerations affecting the cattle business, would naturally support a fluctuation of the type and number
of animals which the particular property might have
from year to year. In this respect, the exact number
of animals so kept on the property by the predecessors
of the Pattersons is not the controlling feature, nor is
any particular immediately preceding year of critical
importance; rather, it is a matter of the nature and
type of use involved.
"In construing an ordinance permitting continuance of any non-conforming use the courts
are not required to speculate as to the number
of acts of business transactions necessary to
constitute an existing use. This holds because
an existing use means the utilization of premises
so that they may be known as being employed
in the neighborhood for a given purpose.

Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17, 198 P.

2d. 134.

"The test of a nonconforming use of land and
dwellings generally is public knowledge of said
use; said knowledge is requisite to its legal
protection against zoning restrictions. That is
to say an existing nonconforming use means a
certain utilization of the premises that they may
be known to the neighborhood as being employed for a given purpose."

Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Arizona 18, 198 P. 2d

134
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"The use need not be in actual operation at
all when the regulation takes effect."

DeFelice v Zoning Board of Appeals of the
Town of East Haven 130 Conn. 156, 32 Atlantic 2d 635
"In the case of businesses that are seasonal
in character the fact that a zoning ordinance
or restriction becomes effective during a season
when such a business is not in operation does
not preclude it from being a legal non-existing
use."

Cynic Association of Dearborn TP, Dist. No.
3 v Horowitz, 318 Michigan 333, 28 N. W. 2d

97

Adams v Kalamazoo Ice and Fuel Co. 245
Mich. 261, 222 N. W. 86
B. A Winter Feeding Usage of 1,000 Cattle on
the "Hooper Farm'' was a Reasonable Use.

--

In his Findings of Fact Judge Cowley held both
that (I) defendants had established a non-conforming
use for 1,000 head of cattle for winter feeding purposes
on the "Hooper Farm" (R. 15-16), and also that (2)
" ... an annual maximum capacity of 1,000 head of
livestock at any given time is a reasonable number
under the circumstances to be kept, maintained and
fed ... during the winter feeding period ... " (R. 15).
This second Finding is significant not only as to the
actual established use of the "Hooper Farm", but reflects a practical reasoned opinion from the Court's
view of the premises and a consideration of all of the
evidence submitted.
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As a practical matter, the history of the "Hooper
Farm" clearly established its adaptability for the winter
feeding of livestock by the use of portable feed troughs.
Both the size of the property and its sandy soil condition (Tr. 81, 90) made the farm peculiarly adaptable to this type of feeding. The 1,000 head of cattle
which the Pattersons ran on the property during the
winter seasons of 1964-65 and 1965-66 were by no
means capacity numbers considering the size of the
farm and its type of soil. Frank Patterson testified
that at least double that number would be practical
in the area (Tr. 90) :
A. "Well, as few months as we stay there, I
think we could put 2,000 head on there and
not do any damage to the ground. I think
you'd have better crops with 2,000 head."
Although plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint ( R. 8) seeking to allege that the activity of
defendants constituted a common nuisance (and which
was denied (R. 9) since Clinton City did not have a
nuisance ordinance, and actions sounding in nuisance
for cities of its class would have to be brought by the
Utah Attorney General), the entire trial proceedings
and the evidence submitted is significantly devoid of
any reference or proof that the activity of the defendants resulted in offensive noises or smells to the few
scattered neighbors living in the area. Obviously, certain property owners in the vicinity of the "Hooper
Farm" apparently objected to the defendants' purchase of the property, but the evidence was completely
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lacking that there was any nuisance created. In fact,
had that matter come to issue the Pattersons were prepared to introduce a good number of witnesses who
had homes surrounding their winter feeding operations,
and who would have testified that the number of livestock and the manner in which they were fed, with
rotating and moveable facilities, were commendable,
clean and non-offensive in all respects. The testimony
would have further revealed, from a good number of
witnesses, that the cattle feeding operation was efficiently maintained, aesthetically desirable from the
standpoint of appearances in a country area, and that
the resulting crop production during the summer months
on the subject properties produced lush crops and a
generally beautiful neighborhood.
The general rule is clearly spelled out in McQuillen on "Municipal Corporations", Vol. 8, sec.
25.181, p. 468, and in the case of Wilkins v San Bernardino 29 Cal. 2d 332, 17 5 P 2d 542:
" ... a zoning ordinance is invalid and unreasonable where it attempts to exclude and prohibit existing and established uses or businesses
that are not nuisances."

*

*

*

"A fair exercise of the police power requires
that the object and purpose of the ordinance decided in on the public health, safety
or welfare. The general rule is that aesthetic
objects in themselves cannot justify the exercise
29

of police or zoning power that restricts or impairs property rights."

Lockner v New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 Law.
Ed. 937, 25 Supreme Court 539

"Esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury
and indulgence rather than a matter of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the
exercise of police power to take private property
without compensation . (Pfister v Municipr;l
Council of Clifton) 133 N. J. L. 148, 43 At. 2d
275. Certainly a zoning ordinance which destrovs
the greater part of the value of property of ~n
owner, and which has as its basis the mere enhancement of the beauty of the municipality, '
is unreasonable as to such property owner.
(Evanns v Gunn 177 .Misc. 85, 29 N. Y. S. 2d :
368) ... It has been ruled that a zoning ordinance prohibiting garages in a specified district
is unreasonable as it does not affect public
health, safety, or general welfare."
1

McQuillen, sec. 25.30 Vol. 8, p. 64. "Municipal Corporations".

If the Court should harbor any thoughts that the
"Hooper Farm" was in a populated area, an exami- .
nation of Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 can undoubtedly serve
to illustrate the locality and type of operation much
better than pages of argument. Likewise, Exhibits l,
2 and 3 (which show the 80-acre tract in the west end
of Clinton Citv where the actual "feed lot" is located)·
further point .out the general remoteness and agricultural nature of the entire area with which we are con1

1

cerned.
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C. The Extent of Defendants' Winter Feeding
Usage of the "Hooper Farm" Was Established At the
Time of the June 3, 1965 Ordi'TWlnce.
Much of the preceding discussion is by this time
undoubtedly moot, if this argument has been clearly
presented, for the simple reason that defendants had
in fact established a numerical usage of 1,000 head of
livestock for winter feeding purposes on the "Hooper
Farm" when the winter feeding ordinance of June 3,
1965, became effective. In short, during the winter
season of 1964-65 defendants actually ran 965 head
of animals on the "Hooper Farm". It was on June 3,
1965 that the ordinance establishing 6 head per acre
was adopted, thereby actually in fact following an
established usage of the type contemplated by the ordinance. Further during the following winter season
of 1965-66, 1,015 head were wintered on the same property (Tr. 86). Summons and complaint issued on or
about February 9, 1966.
Although plaintiff would hope to relate the June
3, 1965 ordinance back to the February, 1964 general
ordinance, the law and the chronology of facts and circumstances in this case clearly indicate that it cannot
do so.
Zoning ordinances and their amendments take
effect from a legally prescribed date, and do not operate
retroactively. Therefore, a minimum usage of the "Hooper" place of 1,000 animals per year for winter feeding
could not be denied them under the facts of this case.
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"A zoning ordinance takes effect from the prescribed date by law."

London v. Robimon 94 Cal. App. 77 4, 271 p

921.

"As a rule the ordinance operates prospectively and as to new uses only and not retroactively
or as to existing non-conforming uses."

Allen v Corpus Christi (Tex.) 247 S. W. 2d,
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"As in the case of the original zoning ordinance, an amending or appealing ordinance takes
effect from the legally prescribed date. Charter
provisions may govern the effective date of a
zoning ordinance amendment."

Riverdale Community Planning Association,
Inc. vs Crinnion, 133 N. Y. Supp. 2d 706
"A zoning ordinance may not operate retroactively to deprive the property owner of his
previously vested right; that is to say, a zoning
ordinance cannot deprive the owner of the use

to which the property was put before the enactment of the ordinance."
Tram-Oceanic Corporation v Santa Barbara

85 Cal. App 2d 776 194 P2d 148

State v. Bellview 45 Washington 2d 492, 275

P2d 899

"Subsequent zoning ordinances cannot div~st
rights acquired by property owners under pr10r
zoning ordinances.''

State v Superior Court of King County 144

Washington 244, 284 P. 93

"Zoning regulations cannot be made retro-
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active and neither can prior nonconforming uses
be removed or existing conditions be affected
thereby."

Dunes v Los Angeles 211 California 304, 295

P. 14

Although plaintiffs might contend that the June
3, 1965 ordinance was a modification or relenting of a
more harsh position as to Uses by Right established
by the February 1964 Ordinance, such a position cannot
stand up under the facts of the case, the general confusion which reigned as to the subject, and an analysis
of the ordinance itself. The following points are suggested for consideration concerning a comparison of
the general ordinance of 1964 and th specific ordinance
of June 3, 1965:
(1) The definition of Agricultural in the 1964
general ordinance, wherein was included the

phrase--'"and specifically excluding "livestock feed lots" --can only be reasonably
interpreted as permitting, by implication,
less objectionable livestock feeding systems.
(2) The provisions of the June 3, 1965 Ordinance (which contained provisions applicable only to these defendants) point out that
plaintiff felt the winter feeding situation
was not covered by the 1964 general ordinance.
(3) If the 1964 general ordinance prohibited
winter field feeding, why did plaintiff feel it
necessary to adopt the June 3, 1965 Ordinance - and with provisions which conformed in exact detail with the feeding procedure followed by respondents?
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III.
THE EXTENT OF \VINTER FEEDING
OPERATIONS ON THE VARIOUS FIELDS
OF THE "HOME FARM" WAS NEVER AT
ISSUE IN THE LITIGATION.
As previously pointed out, the matter of winter
feeding on the various fields involving the "Home
Farm" was never raised-if at all-until respondents
were served with the Motion To Amend Complaint
setting up the June 3, 1965 ordinance, just about four
or five days prior to trial. The winter feeding program
on the established older properties of respondents had
been conducted for many years prior to the passage
of any of the involved ordinances, and by the admission
of all concerned constituted a non-conforming use.

i

As the trial commenced it soon became obvious
that the only property of real concern in the litigation
was the "Hooper Farm", and that the extent of the
usage on the "Home Farm" was of only incidental
concern. Although appellant questioned the Pattersons
relative to some of the feeding practices and numbers
of animals as to the "Home Farm", counsel for re·
spondents - proceeding under the representation of
appellants that the "Hooper Farm" was the only prop·
erty involved-did not attempt to furnish detailed num· j
bers of animals kept on the various fields of that prop· /
erty.
1

I

In announcing its decision in the matter the Court, I
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'

in referring to the "Home Farm" stated (Supp. Record):
"The court further finds that the defendants
have a non-conforming use for the winter feeding of 1000 head of cattle on the "Hooper Property" and are not restricted to feeding 250 head
of cattle within a fenced area on said "Hooper
Property".

"Issues pertainining to defendants' other lands
apparently are not in dispute but should be
covered by the Findings, Conclusions and Decree . . . " ( I talics added) .

Sid Charles G. Cowley

District Judge

Proceeding with the instruction of the Court, counsel for respondents, in preparing the F'indings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree, inserted a paragraph in the Findings (R. 12} relating
to a maximum usage of 2,500 head of livestock at any
time for winter feeding purposes on the "Home Farm",
and set forth two additional pages (R. 13-14} attempting to reasonably detail the number of animals per
field on such property. This maximum number of
2,500 head of livestock was carried forward into the
Judgment and Decree (R. 20}.
The involved portions of the Findings of Fact were
submitted to counsel for appellants by respondent several months before the Motion For New Trial was
argued since the parties were desirous, if possible, of
working out some of the differences. However, the
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matter eventually came before the Court for the signing of the Findings of Fact, and Judgment and Decree, and it was argued. At the time of argument counsel for respondents agreed to eliminate pages 4 and 5
(R. 13-14) of the Findings-thereby fixing a simple
maximum number of 2,500 head of livestock on the
entire "Home Farm", but counsel for appellants decided perhaps that those pages should not be deleted.
At any rate, the upshot of the matter as to the "Home
Farm" was that Judge Cowley entered his :Minute
Entry (R. 29) stating:
"Counsel will confer on working out some of
the problems and agree that the :Motion for a
New Trial is submitted on the issue of the Hooper Property.
"Court takes matter under advisement."
C.G.C."
On March 31, 1967, Judge Cowley made his Final
Minute Entry Ruling (R. 30) on the :Motion For New
Trial, as follows:
"This matter having been taken under advisement the Court now finds the Plaintiffs' Objections To Proposed Findings of Fact and Mo
tion For New Trial is hereby denied, except as
to such changes in the proposed Findings that
apply to the so-called Home Properties, which
the parties have agreed to."
C.G.C."
'Vhy the appellants seek to raise any question
concerning the amount of liYestock numbers on the
"Home Farm" at this point is extremely difficult to
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understand. As pointed out previously from the evidence, a given number of animals can only be kept on
a single field for a limited period of time due to the
amount of fertilizer which can be utilized by the soil,
the type of soil, and the number of animals involved.
In short, a larger herd would be on a small field for
a very limited time, whereas a small number of animals
might be on the field for a larger length of time. In
the absence of nuisance considerations, the matter
simply resolves itself from the standpoint of practical
considerations. This total lack of understanding of
the problem helps to explain why appellant has floundered around so much in its attempts to formulate
realistic ordinances.
Another unusual and interesting facet to the livestock numbers which can be fed during the winter
months on the "Home Farm" is that the actual winter
feeding usage of the "Home Farm" was more than
3,000 head. Frank Patterson testified (R. 99) :
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Now going back to 1962
and '63, that winter, could you give us a little
idea as to the numbers you had?

A. No, that was before we bought that Hooper
place. We had around about, oh, I'd say we
fed around about 3000 head.

Q. About 3000 head?
A. That's right. I thing it's a fraction over 3000
head of cattle.
Q. Were most of the 3000 head similarly wintered on the Home place?
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A. That's right.

Q. I take it from your testimony, then, that
when you secured the Hooper place, the net
effect has been to somewhat reduce the winter
number that you carried on the Home place! •
A. That's right."

(R. 99) :

The very peculiar aspect of this case is that re·
spondents have actually conceded a usage right of 500
animals on their "Home Farm", which they could have
clearly established had this matter been fully litigated.
On the other hand, they have been awarded a usage
right of 400 head more than the June 3, 1965 Ordinance
would have given them for the "Hooper Farm" as a
result of the litigation. It is obvious that the appellants
in this action have gained an overall advantage limiting the total net winter feeding usage of the Pattersons in the entire area by 100 head of animals.

IV.
THE INVOLVED ORDINANCES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED AT THESE DEFENDANTS.
The foregoing discussion has pointed out that the
reference to "livestock feed lots" in the 1964 general
ordinance, and the specific provisions of the June 3,
1965 ordinance relating to winter feeding of livestock,
all appear to be peculiarly aimed at these respondents.
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Other evidence further proves that the ordinances
adopted by plaintiff require this conclusion.
Prior to the adoption of the June 3, 1965 winter
feeding ordinance there were recommendations made
to the plaintiffs' city council by the Clinton City Planning Commission that winter feeding activities of livestock within the community be fixed at substantial
numbers of animals in excess of the number finally
placed in the ordinance. Lewis Patterson testified that
the Planning Commission made recommendations to the
City Council relative to winter feeding operations of
15, 10 and finally 8 head per acre (Tr. 177), and that
the Planning Commission ref used to agree with the
final figure adopted by the City Council of 6 head
per acre for winter feeding purposes. Similarly, and
as to the same June 3, 1965 Ordinance, wherein there
was a limitation of 250 head which could be kept in
a given field for winter feeding purposes, the City
Council adopted such a provision contrary to any recommendation of the Planning Commission (Tr. 177):
Q. "Now as to the provision relative to a maximum that they've got in this ordinance of
250 head of livestock confined within the
same fenced area, was that a recommendation of the Planning Commission?

A. No, it was not."
Both the City Recorder (Tr. 39) and Lewis Patterson (Tr. 180) stated that the attempt to limit the
number of livestock to a given fenced area would affect
no property owners in the Clinton City area other than
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the Pattersons. When questioned as to the effect of
such a limitation, the following answers were given:
FRANK PATTERSON (Tr. 95-96) :

Q. (Mr. Fuller) \V ould it be practical, Mr. Patterson, to group these livestock into units
of 250 head and keep them in single fenced
fields?
A. No. You couldn't do it. \Ve haven't got the
water facilities, to start with, and you couldn't
divide them up that it. It wouldn't work for
you.

Q. From the standpoint of taking the feed and
feeding the animals, would a group of 250
head be as practical as your larger group!
A. No.
Q. And why not?
A. \Vell, you take the larger group-we have
the water there for them. And you take where
you're feeding a large group, you take a big
load of silage out-probably two. I think
we fed two to each side.
And on a small group, you'd have to spend
just as much gas to feed probably half that
many or a third that many as you would the
whole works.
While there, your expenses are all eliminated
from the little group, see.
Q. What about your time expenditure?

A. Well, time too. It takes just as much time
to feed 200 head as it would-that is,to haul
that much feed over to a small group or a
little group, as it would a big group ... "
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LEWIS PATTERSON (Tr. 178):
A .."If we were to restrict it to 6 head per acre,
it would be almost impossible to continue
because an individual would have to place
the 6 head in different areas all around. You
couldn't find that many watering areas which
would be suitable.
If we went into a field, for instance-For
instance, let's take the Hooper place. If it
was restricted there to 250 head in a fenced
area, and the 6 head, a person would go there
and they could only take a half a load of
feed in some instances. They would have
to unload a half a load and guess at it, go
to another field and unload the other half."

It is the position of respondents that when a legislative body such as the Clinton City Council attempts
to draft ordinances specifically directed at a given property owner within its jurisdiction, and when such ordinances are so framed that they would have the effect of
destroying the type of usage permitted by limitations
which would not fit modern economic and operating
conditions, such ordinances are invalid and void.
"Zoning is void when it is unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary, or discriminatory."

Beverly Oil Co. v. L,o.s Angeles 40 Cal. 2d

552, 254 p 2d 865

Cassel Realty Co. v Omaha 144 Neb. 753, 14

N. W. 2d 600

"Where the amendment of a zoning ordinance
is clearly an arbitrary and unreasonable action
on the part of the city council and not author-
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ized or contemplated by the zoning statute, it is
of no force and effect."

Michigan Lake Building Corporation v. Hamilton 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710
"Unreasonable discrimination in the classifi.
cation of uses and restrictions of zoning is un- 1
constitutional and void. It violates both equal ·
protection and due process of law."

Wilkins v San Bernardino 29 Cal. 2d 332,

175 P. 2d 542

"Restrictions on uses under comprehensive
zoning must be reasonable and not arbitrary.
Nor can they be discriminatory although they
can make distinctions based on reasonable
grounds related to purposes within the police
power. They must be imposed in the public interest and not for the benefit or to the detriment

of certain property owners."
Eubank v Richmond 226 U. S. 137, 57 Law
Ed. 156, 33 Supreme Court 76

"If a zoning ordinance goes beyond its true
purpose in restricting the use of private property,
it is unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitutional."
N e.ef v Springfield 380 Ill. 27 5, 43 N. E. 2d
947
"A zoning restriction which not only fails to
serve any public interest but which is imposed
to favor or benefit certain private interests, which
is for the purpose of creating a monopoly of use
of property and excluding other enterprises, ?r
which on the other hand, is directed at certam
persons or private interests is unconstitutional
and invalid. It cannot be discriminatory."
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Ridgefield Terrace Realty Co. v Borough of
Ridgefield, 138 N. J. L. 311, 55 A. 2d 812,
Davidson County v Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327,
198 s. w. 2d 812
Funk v Orleans Corp. 159 Fla. 646, 32 S. 2d
425
M cQuillen, "Municipal Corporations", Vol. 8
sec. 25.42 p. 90-91
"Zoning ordinances or amendments are unjustified where they are enacted merely because
certain individuals desire them and have no other
apparent basis."

Kennedy v Evanston 348 Ill. 426, 181 N. E.
312

•

•

•

"Zoning regulations like other ordinance provisions may operate unreasonably in some instances and reasonably in others. Thus, a zoning
ordinance, reasonable in general, may be unreasonable in its application to particular property. Indeed, it is said repeatedly by the courts
that the constitutionality and validity of zoning
must be determined according to the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, and this is
true relative to the reasonableness of such ordinances. Thus, if the property owner seeking
relief shows that the ordinance is unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary as to his property rights
in issue, he need not show that other property
covered by its terms is likewise affected.

McQuillen, "Municipal Corporations" Vol. 8
sec. 25.63, p. 142
"If the gain to the public is small when compared with the hardship imposed on the indi-
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vidual property owner by a zoning ordinance,
no valid basis for exercise of the police power
exists. Zoning laws resulting in relatively little
gain or benefit to the public, while inflicting
serious injury or loss on property owner are confiscatory and void.
Hauser v Arnes 267 P 2d 691, 44 Wash. 2d

I.

-(1954).

CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the decision
of the lower court was correct in that they were not
operating livestock feed lots on their "Hooper Farm''
or their "Home Farm", that the winter feeding on
both properties in the amounts decided by the Court
was both reasonable in amount and that the usage was
a valid non-conforming use, and that the specific provisions of the ordinances relating to winter feeding
of not to exceed 6 head per acre-with a maximum
number of 250 head of livestock within a fenced area
--constitute void legislation as to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Respondents
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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